This paper explores the origins and impact of "truth-in-advertising" regulation during the Progressive era. Was advertising regulation adopted in response to rent-seeking on the part of firms who sought to limit the availability of advertising as a competitive device? Or was advertising regulation desired because it furnished a mechanism through which firms could improve the credibility of advertising?
I. INTRODUCTION
State regulation of advertising emerged in the early twentieth century. Under the rubric of the "truth-in-advertising movement," a coalition of reformers representing manufacturing, retailing and publishing interests lobbied state governments to enact legislation that made false advertising a misdemeanor. These state laws represented the first broad effort to regulate commercial speech and formed the foundation of subsequent advertising regulation in America. In this paper we explore why these regulations emerged, why these particular interests sought regulation, and what effects these regulations may have had.
It is commonly argued that regulation is the product of rent-seeking by producer interests who seek entry-barriers that increase their profits at the expense of overall welfare (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976) . Indeed, since Kolko (1963) scholars have argued that Progressive Era regulations like railroad regulation, meat inspection, antitrust, and "blue sky laws" were enacted to tilt the competitive playing field in ways that benefited certain producer groups, harmed consumers, and lowered welfare (Gilligan, Weingast and Marshall 1989; Libecap 1992; Mahoney 2003) . In the context of truth-in-advertising regulation, two such hypotheses seem plausible. The first argues that regulation served the interests of a broad coalition of producers and retailers who sought to collectively limit the use of advertising as a competitive device. A second explanation posits that regulation was desired by a subset of smaller, local producers, who wanted to competitively disadvantage the growth of larger, national brands through the regulation of advertising copy. In either case, regulation was designed to benefit producer interests (or a subset of producer interests), harm consumers, and lower overall efficiency.
An alternative explanation for the emergence of truth-in-advertising regulation posits that the pressure for state-level advertising regulation reflected a real, albeit subtle, concern about the potentially negative consequences of misleading advertising.
1 The "rotten-apple" hypothesis, which has been advanced by the historical literature on the advertising industry, argues that advertising regulation was adopted because it furnished a mechanism through which firms could collectively improve the credibility of advertising (Kenner 1936; Pease 1958; Pope 1983) . During this period, it was widely believed by advertising interests-who consisted of manufacturers of highly advertised products, retailers, publishers, and advertising agents-that untruthful advertising imposed a negative externality on all advertising, and that misleading advertisements were a rottenapple that reduced the credibility of all advertising. False advertising was therefore perceived to be harmful not only to consumers, who might be mislead, but also to other businesses since it reduced the returns to all advertising. Regulation was sought by a broad coalition of producer groups in order to eliminate rotten-apple advertising since the court system could not be easily used by producer and consumer groups who were negatively affected by false advertising. This third hypothesis, like the first two, is also a rent-seeking story in that it involved producers lobbying the state for regulation that 1 It is generally believed that advertising, as a costly signal, serves as a mechanism for solving the asymmetric information problem about product quality. Advertising can reduce the extent of asymmetric information either by serving as a pure signal of quality, or by directly informing consumers about product characteristics. In some theoretical models of advertising (Nelson 1974; Schmalensee 1978; Milgrom and Roberts 1986) , because advertising is a sunk cost, only high quality producers have an incentive to advertise in equilibrium. Hence, in these models, the information conveyed by advertising is not important; all that matters is that one advertises. Nelson (1974) , among others, finds some empirical evidence in favor of this perspective. In other models, however, advertising may play a directly informative role in helping consumers determine product characteristics (Butters 1977; Grossman and Shapiro 1984) . As a result, it is not sufficient that firms advertise; it is also important that the firm's advertising be credible. In a setting where the credibility of advertising is suspect, advertising is unlikely to function effectively as a market mechanism for solving the asymmetric information problem.
would create private benefits, but in this case, rent-seeking by producers also generated benefits for consumers in the way of improved information about product quality.
To test these hypotheses we take advantage of cross-state and temporal variation in the introduction of advertising regulation at the state-level during the early decades of the twentieth century to investigate the causal relationships among advertising regulation, the level of advertising expenditures (a proxy for total investment in advertising by firms), and the composition of advertising expenditures. According to the first hypothesis regulation should reduce the level of investment in advertising. The second hypothesis argues that advertising regulation should shift advertising away from national outlets (magazines) and towards more local outlets (newspapers). The last hypothesis posits that regulation, by improving the credibility of advertising, should increase investment in advertising. We find that state advertising legislation significantly increased the level of real per capita advertising expenditures at the state-level, controlling for other factors.
This result survives a variety of robustness checks. We find no evidence that regulation shifted advertising away from magazines and towards newspapers. Finally, we find that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act of 1914 had a more positive effect on real advertising expenditures per capita within states that had already enacted a truth-inadvertising law. We believe this body of evidence supports the third hypothesis because it suggests that regulation increased firms' willingness to invest in advertising.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides historical background on the rise of advertising in turn-of-the-century America. This is followed in Section III by a discussion of the three competing hypotheses for advertising regulation.
Section IV presents our empirical evidence. In Section V we demonstrate that our key empirical finding is robust. Section VI concludes.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Falling transportation costs during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries made possible tremendous increases in specialization (Kim 1998 (Kim , 2000 . While specialization increases the gains from trade, specialization also comes at the cost of asymmetric information about product quality. The more specialized individuals are, the less they know about the goods and services produced by others (Wallis and North 1986) .
As is well known, asymmetric information about product quality can give rise to the "lemons problem" in which low quality goods dominate the market (Akerlof 1970 ).
Many scholars have noted the role that market mechanisms play in reducing informational asymmetries. Klein and Leffler (1981) , for instance, show how nonsalvageable investments in reputation-such as brand name development and advertising-can play a role in signaling quality to consumers. Along these lines, Kim (2001) argues that multiunit firms and retail chains emerged during this time as solutions to this asymmetric information problem. Hence, it is not surprising that this period of rapid specialization also witnessed the widespread use of advertising and the proliferation of brand names. Indeed, it was during this period that a new group of middlemenadvertising agents-emerged, first to negotiate advertising rates with newspapers and magazines on behalf of manufacturers and distributors, and later, to develop more persuasive forms of advertising copy (Pease 1958 Hence, many sources point to significant growth in advertising during this time.
In turn-of-the-century America, most advertising was either by direct mail or in newspapers or magazines. Even by 1935, after the introduction of radio as an alternative medium for advertising, over 40 percent of all advertising was placed in newspapers and magazines and direct mail advertising comprised another 30 percent (Borden 1942, p. 54) . Additionally, throughout this period, local advertising in newspapers and magazines constituted approximately 80 percent of all advertising in these media (Pease 1958, p. 14) . While information on advertising costs is limited, the available evidence indicates that they were not substantial. Local and national firms advertised widely, as did firms producing products of varying qualities. Indeed, products like patent medicines, which were often produced by very small firms, were among the most heavily advertised products (Young 1967; Pope 1983 In fact, the credibility of advertising was one of the most frequently discussed issues among publishers and advertising men of this period (Kenner 1936) . It was widely believed by these groups that advertising would be of little value if it were not perceived to be truthful by consumers and that the credibility of all advertising could be challenged by a few, untruthful ads. This sentiment was the official view of the editors of Printer's Ink, the most widely circulated advertising trade periodical. According to Pope (1983, p. 191) Printer's Ink believed that " [O] ne false statement in an advertisement would weaken its effect; one false advertisement would injure a seller's credibility permanently; one discredited advertiser would harm the advertising of all others." In other words, untruthful advertising that misrepresented various dimensions of product quality had the potential to impose a negative externality on all advertising.
former newspaper man and advertising manager (Kenner 1936; Pope 1983; Borden 1942 Table 1 ). Enforcement of these laws was largely left to local advertising clubs (which later became known as the Better Business Bureaus or BBBs). These BBBs monitored local advertising, received complaints from consumers and other producers, investigated suspect ads, and used the threat of prosecution under these truth-inadvertising laws to induce compliance on the part of firms (Kenner 1936; Pope 1983) .
Indeed, because the BBBs were able to threaten misleading advertisers with prosecution under truth-in-advertising regulation, much compliance was achieved without lawsuits. 1921) . Although the total number of prosecutions under these state laws was low, the available qualitative evidence indicates that the mere threat of a lawsuit provided the BBBs with the moral authority to correct advertising abuses (Pope 1983; Pease 1958) . Indeed, the fact that the constitutionality of state truth-in-advertising legislation was challenged in state courts suggests that the BBBs' efforts to enforce these laws against misleading advertisers were quite effective (Pannell 2002) . The constitutionality of these laws, however, was never overturned in state or federal courts.
Hence, it would seem that while enforcement of truth-in-advertising regulation was largely informal, it was quite successful.
III. THREE HYPOTHESES FOR ADVERTISING REGULATION
It is widely argued that regulation is enacted to confer competitive advantages on certain producers at the expense of overall efficiency. Politically organized producers often seek regulation to reduce the number of firms in a market, limit the availability of substitutes, or to constrain the strategic options available to competing firms. Regulation that serves these purposes increases the profits of certain firms, but generally reduces economic welfare (Stigler 1971 , Peltzman 1976 ). In our view, there are two plausible hypotheses for advertising regulation that are consistent with this perspective.
The first hypothesis argues that truth-in-advertising regulation conferred competitive advantages on producers by collectively limiting the use of advertising as a competitive device. A significant body of evidence demonstrates that the prices of goods and services tend to be higher in places that restrict advertising than in places that do not (Benham 1972; Cady 1976; Kwoka 1984) . This evidence is sometimes invoked as an explanation for why associations representing doctors, lawyers, and other professional groups often seek regulation that limits advertising. While organized producers like professional associations may be able to obtain advertising regulation specific to their industry, a general truth-in-advertising law has the potential to benefit a broader group of producers, and may be easier to cloak in the "public interest." If truth-in-advertising regulation, by raising the cost of advertising, also succeeded in reducing its extent, firms in many industries might have an incentive to seek such regulation since it would result in less competition and higher retail prices. Under this hypothesis, advertising regulation should shift inward the derived demand for advertising space and reduce the quantity of advertising, other things held constant.
A second hypothesis posits that regulation was desired by a subset of smaller, local producers, who wanted to competitively disadvantage the growth of larger, national brands through the regulation of advertising copy. The early twentieth century witnessed the rise of large, national firms that were able to obtain economies of scale and scope in the production of a wide range of goods and services. Smaller local producers often found themselves at a competitive disadvantage with respect to these larger firms. Statelevel regulations like meat inspection, antitrust, chain store taxes, were often sought by local firms seeking to stem the competitive threat posed by these larger firms (Libecap 1992; Ross 1986) . Kim (1999) argues that large, multiunit firms obtained significant economies of scale in marketing and advertising their products. Was truth-in-advertising regulation motivated by a desire on the part of small, local firms to limit the competitive advantage enjoyed by larger, national brands?
To evaluate this hypothesis, we examine how advertising regulation affected the composition of advertising volumes. If state-level advertising regulation disadvantaged national brands, we would expect to see the share of advertising by national brands to decline and the share of advertising by local producers to rise. Unfortunately, systematic data on the national versus local composition of advertising is not available. However, we were able to collect advertising revenue data separately for newspapers and magazines.
Since magazine advertising was consisted primarily of national brands while local firms dominated newspaper advertising, we can proxy for national and local advertising shares (Pease 1958) . Under this second hypothesis, the share of total advertising placed in magazines should decline following the enactment of advertising regulation.
A third hypothesis is that regulation was sought by various interests to eliminate "rotten-apple" advertisements that threatened the credibility of all advertising. According to this hypothesis, advertising regulation was desired as a solution to a negative externality problem caused by a few, misleading advertisements. Because advertising was inexpensive and widely available to most firms, the mere expenditure of resources on advertising was not a reliable signal of quality. In such an environment, much of advertising's value depended on its credibility as a mechanism for conveying information about product characteristics. Misleading advertisements that reduced the credibility of advertising were perceived to be harmful not only to consumers but also to other businesses, since they reduced the value of advertising as a marketing device.
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Regulations that made it more costly to place misleading or untruthful advertisements were desired to eliminate this negative externality.
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A refutable implication of the rotten-apple hypothesis for advertising regulation is that regulation should improve the credibility of advertising. It is not possible to directly measure the credibility or truthfulness of advertising in an objective fashion. However, we can indirectly infer the effect of regulation on the credibility of advertising by examining the relationship between regulation and the level of investment in advertising.
If regulation improves the credibility of advertising, it should increase the returns to advertising, shift outward the derived demand for advertising space, and increase the quantity of advertising, other things equal.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

A. Effects of state-level advertising regulation
The three hypotheses outlined make different predictions regarding the relationship between advertising regulation and the quantity of advertising. The testable implication of the first hypothesis is that regulation limits competition and reduces the industry executives apparently believed that untruthful advertising was a negative externality for all advertising. While certain retailers and publishers attempted to self-censor their advertising copy (Pope 1983, p. 188) , it soon became clear that it was costly for any individual business to improve the credibility of its own advertising. First, for publishers, forgone advertising revenues were substantial. Earnings from advertising constituted an increasingly large percentage of total newspaper and magazine revenues. Officials from Good Housekeeping magazine estimated that their losses from refusing to print suspect advertising exceeded a million dollars between 1912 and 1930 (Pease 1958, p. 82) . Second, for many products like patent medicines, foods, textiles, and furniture, the benefits of short-term deception about product quality were large (Young 1967; Watkins 1940) . For these reasons, trade associations were generally unwilling to discipline their members for misleading advertisements. Self-censure at the firm or industry level was therefore not a viable solution. 4 The potential to be sued in the courts for selling defective products to customers should also discipline firms. However, during the Progressive Era, the courts generally did not protect the rights of consumers who were harmed by producers. Glaeser and Shleifer (2003) , for instance, argue that the disproportionate influence of large business during the Progressive Era made the court system an unsuitable arena for resolving disputes between consumers and firms.
level of advertising. According to the second hypothesis, regulation shifts advertising away from national media (magazines) and towards local media (newspapers). The third hypothesis argues that regulation, by improving the credibility of advertising, increases the level of advertising. In this section, we take advantage of cross-state and temporal variation in the adoption of state-level truth-in-advertising regulation to test these hypotheses. Our data consists of a balanced panel of state-year observations taken from the 1899, 1909, 1914, 1919, 1923 and 1929 manufacturing censuses.
To test these hypotheses we examine the effects of advertising regulation on the level and composition of advertising revenues. Ideally, we would like to analyze the impact of regulation on the quantity of advertising placed by producers and retailers.
Although we do not have systematic data on advertising quantities, for our purposes, it is sufficient to examine the effect of regulation on advertising revenues. 5 Holding constant the supply curve for advertising space, an inward shift in the derived demand for advertising space should reduce the quantity of advertising and total advertising revenues, and an outward shift in the derived demand should increase both the quantity of advertising and total advertising revenues. Hence, we can identify changes in quantities by examining changes in revenues.
This seems like a plausible empirical framework. This is because truth-inadvertising laws made it more costly for manufacturers and retailers to advertise but they did not make it more costly for publishers to print false advertisements. In fact, in many states, publishers were explicitly exempted from liability under the law. In other words, the laws targeted the demanders of advertising space (manufacturers and retailers), not the suppliers of advertising space (publishers and advertising agents). This implies that regulation should affect the derived demand for advertising space, but not the supply.
Unfortunately, data on total advertising revenues across all forms of advertising media by firms or by states are not available in this period. However, we do have census data on the advertising revenues of newspapers and magazines in each state in each census year. We believe this is a reasonable proxy for the volume of advertising during this time, as print media earned the largest portion of total advertising revenues.
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The primary outcome variable we examine is the level of real advertising revenues per capita at the state-year level. 7 In order to make valid causal inferences about the effect of advertising legislation on advertising expenditures, we need to establish that the timing of regulation was exogenous with respect to other factors that may have influenced the level of advertising. In particular, we are concerned that states that adopted advertising regulation earlier were also states where advertising was more prevalent. To investigate this possibility, we estimated Weibull hazard regressions that explain the timing of state truth-in-advertising laws as a function of time invariant state-level conditions before the introduction of advertising regulation (see Table A1 in the Appendix). The hazard regressions indicate that the level of advertising per capita in 1909 did not have a statistically significant influence on the timing of advertising legislation. The coefficients on urbanization, manufacturing per capita, and income per capita are statistically significant, but especially for manufacturing and income per capita, 6 Henceforth we use the terms advertising expenditures and advertising revenues interchangeably. By definition total expenditures by firms on advertising in newspapers and magazines must equal total advertising revenues earned by newspapers and magazines. 7 We divided total advertising expenditures by state population to normalize for differences in market size across states and converted these figures to real 1967 dollars using CPI. We could not control more directly for market size using circulation data because circulation figures were not reported consistently across the various manufacturing censuses.
the hazard ratio is close to unity. Accordingly, we will also control directly for these factors when we examine the effects of regulation on advertising. Our basic regression model is as follows:
where y it is the outcome variable (either real per capita advertising expenditures or the share of total advertising revenues placed in magazines), R it is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a state has adopted regulation by a given census year and 0 otherwise, X it is a vector of state-year control variables, T t are year fixed-effects, S i are state fixed-effects and ε it is an error term. The coefficient of interest is β, which shows the effect of regulation on the outcome variable. As control variables we include real per capita income, the urbanization rate, and the level of real manufacturing per capita since they are likely correlated with the level of economic development within a state and the extent of advertising. 8 Descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 2 .
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3A While our fixed-effect framework controls for state-specific political tastes that change similarly across all states, it is possible that liberal reform sentiment evolved differently in different places. Our solution to this problem is to include indicator variables for Progressive Era reforms like civil service merit reform, the presence of initiative and referenda, direct primaries, and child labor laws that were adopted at different times in different states. The regressions displayed in Table 3B (3) and (4) in Table 3A display the regression results using this alternative measure of regulation. We continue to find a positive and statistically significant relationship between advertising regulation and the level of real per capita advertising. The magnitude of this effect is similar as well. As shown in column (2) of Table 3B this result is also robust to the inclusion of state-specific Progressive reform measures.
The evidence presented so far is consistent with the third hypothesis, which argues that regulation should increase advertising, but not supportive of the first, which posits that regulations should reduce advertising. As a test the second hypothesis, we examined the relationship between advertising regulation and the share of total print advertising in national magazines since the second hypothesis argues that regulation shifted the composition of advertising revenues away from national and toward local outlets. Table 4A displays regressions where the dependent variable is the share of total advertising in magazines. The coefficient on the regulation indicator variable is never statistically significant, indicating that advertising regulation did not influence the composition of advertising revenues These results are unaffected by how we measure advertising regulation. In addition, the regression results reported in Table 4B show that the level of per capita real advertising revenues in magazines was also unaffected by truth-in-advertising regulation. Hence, to the extent that our dependent variable proxies for the share of national brand advertising, these regression results are not supportive of the second rent-seeking hypothesis which argues advertising regulation reduced competition from national brands.
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B. Effects of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914
In 1914 the US federal government enacted the Federal Trade Commission Act, which created the FTC as a regulatory agency. Although this act gave the commission broad authority over various aspects of competition, it did not specifically mention advertising until the Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1938. Nevertheless, the FTC soon became interested in fraudulent advertising because of its authority to regulate unfair and deceptive selling practices. Shortly after its creation, the FTC met with state and local advertising clubs about the problem of misleading advertising and began to coordinate its enforcement efforts with state and local officials (Watkins 1940 can use a difference-in-differences estimator (DID) to determine the effect of the FTC on advertising.
In order to make valid causal inferences about the additional effect of the FTC Act on advertising, we need to establish that the Act was exogenous with respect to advertising. We are confident that this is in fact the case. First, the historical literature does not suggest that advertising interests played any role in the enactment of the FTC Act (Watkins 1940 The DID regression equation is as follows:
where R it is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a state had adopted regulation prior to 1914 and 0 otherwise, FTC is an indicator variable that equals 1 for all years in which the FTC Act is in effect and 0 otherwise, and the other variables are defined as before. The coefficient of interest in this regression is φ, the coefficient on the interaction term. This coefficient shows the additional effect that the FTC Act had on the outcome variable (either real per capita advertising expenditures or the share of total advertising in magazines) in states that enacted an advertising law prior to 1914.
Columns (1) and (2) display the regression estimates when the level of advertising per capita is the dependent variable. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant in both regressions, suggesting that the FTC Act increased advertising by more in those states that were early adopters of advertising regulation. This result is consistent with the third hypothesis but inconsistent with the first hypothesis. In columns (3) and (4) the dependent variable is the share of magazine advertising. We find no evidence that the FTC Act shifted the composition of advertising away from magazines and towards newspapers by more in those states that were early adopters of regulation. In fact, the regression reported in column (4) Table 6A shows the regression results using the placebo regulation indicator. The regression equations reported in this table are identical to those reported in Table 3A, except that the placebo advertising regulation indicator replaces the true advertising regulation indicator. The coefficient on the placebo regulation indicator is never statistically significant. This suggests that advertising regulation did in fact have a positive and statistically significant effect on real advertising expenditures per capita.
We also coded regulation as having been enacted five years after the true enactment of a truth-in-advertising law. For example, if Kentucky enacted an advertising law in 1917, our delayed truth-in-advertising regulation variable codes Kentucky as having introduced a law in 1922. While the placebo (accelerated) regulation indicator should have no effect on advertising expenditures per capita, the delayed regulation indicator should have a statistically significant effect. Indeed, we might expect to observe an even larger effect using the delayed regulation indicator than the true regulation indicator because regulation may take time to have an impact on the advertising industry. Table 6B shows the results using the delayed regulation indicator. As expected, the coefficients on these indicators are positive and statistically significant and, interestingly, they are also larger in magnitude than the coefficients on the true advertising regulation indicator reported in Table 3A .
As an additional robustness check, we re-estimated our regressions using real tax revenues per capita as an alternative outcome variable. Clearly, advertising regulation should not have a positive effect on tax revenues per capita. A positive and significant relationship between advertising regulation and tax revenues per capita would suggest that our original regressions are spurious, and that our advertising regulation variable is picking up an omitted factor, perhaps liberal political sentiment that is positively correlated with advertising, the size of government, and the propensity to regulate. The regressions using tax revenues per capita as the outcome variable are shown in Table 7 .
The coefficient on the advertising regulation indicator variable is either not statistically significant, or negative and significant. This provides additional evidence that our key findings are not spurious.
In each of our key regressions, the coefficient on manufacturing per capita is positive and significant. Advertising per capita and manufacturing per capita are therefore highly correlated. A possible concern is that both variables are simply proxies for the level of economic development. If more economically developed states are also more likely to regulate industry, then our regressions will overestimate the effect of advertising regulation. To rule out this possibility, we examined the relationship between advertising regulation and the value of manufacturing per capita. The regressions displayed in Table   8 show that advertising regulation had no effect on the level of manufacturing per capita at the state-level. Accordingly, we do not believe that simultaneity of this kind is a concern.
VI. CONCLUSION
During the late 1800s and early 1900s, specialization, growing product sophistication, and the rise of impersonal exchange created a role for advertising as a mechanism through which producers could communicate aspects of product quality to consumers. In a world where consumers knew less and less about the products they were purchasing, advertising furnished an efficient medium through which producers could communicate aspects of product quality to consumers. Hence, it is not surprising that this period of rapid technological and organizational change also witnessed a dramatic increase in the volume of advertising.
The value of advertising as a communication device was well understood by a coalition of producers, retailers, and publishers. Indeed, these groups quickly perceived that the usefulness of advertising would be undermined if advertising was believed to be misleading or deceptive, and they argued that false advertising by one advertiser had the potential to undermine the credibility of all advertising. Thus, advertising interests organized rapidly to curb misleading and untruthful advertising through government regulation.
In this paper we present evidence that suggests that truth-in-advertising regulation was indeed sought by advertising interests in an effort to stem the negative effects of misleading advertising. We find that the data do not support the two most plausible alternative explanations for advertising regulation. In particular, we find that truth-in-advertising regulation did not reduce the extent of advertising overall nor did it shift the composition of advertising in ways that benefited local firms. This suggests that advertising regulation did not function as an anti-competitive device that either limited competition directly or hampered the growth of national brands. Instead, we uncover a robust positive and statistically significant effect of regulation on advertising expenditures in newspapers and magazines. We interpret these results as supportive of the rotten-apple hypothesis, which argues that regulation, by improving the credibility of advertising, should increase overall investment in advertising.
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We believe this study complements and contributes to a growing literature on the nature of Progressive Era regulation. Recent studies of Progressive Era reform indicate that broader coalitions in favor of regulation increase the likelihood that regulation will be adopted (Fishback and Kantor 1998; Law 2003; Mahoney 2003) . In the context of truth-in-advertising regulation, a broad coalition of business interests sought advertising regulation and, as shown in Table 1 , regulation diffused across states very quickly. In addition, while studies of Progressive Era regulations like chain store taxes, meat inspection, and "blue sky laws" suggest that many regulations were enacted to tilt the 11 The rotten-apple story for advertising regulation is also better able to account for the nature of the political constituency in favor of regulation than the other two hypotheses. The key players in the push for advertising regulation were publishers and advertising agents. Publishers and advertising agents would clearly be most affected by regulation that improves the credibility of advertising. Broad regulation aimed at improving the perceived credibility of advertising across the board would presumably increase the earnings of publishers and advertising agents if in fact misleading advertising was a "rotten apple" that reduced the returns to advertising overall. While producers and retailers might benefit from a reduction in the extent of competition brought about by advertising regulation that limits the amount of advertising or changes the composition of advertising, publishers and advertising agents certainly would not. In fact, in the late 1800s and early 1900s, earnings from advertising constituted an increasingly large percentage of total newspaper and magazine revenues. Advertising revenues as a share of total newspaper and magazine earnings increased from 44 percent in 1880 to 65 percent in 1920 (US Bureau of the Census 1880, 1920). Publishers and advertising agents would probably have opposed regulation that reduced these revenues. Thus, it seems unlikely that publishers and advertising agents would find it in their interests to support advertising regulation that reduced the extent of advertising.
competitive playing field in ways that benefited specific producer groups (Ross 1986; Libecap 1992; Mahoney 2003) , another set of studies finds that other Progressive Era regulations, specifically those related to food, drugs, and professional quality, were primarily motivated by a desire to reduce informational asymmetries, and only secondarily, to tilt the competitive playing field through the introduction of entry barriers (Law 2003; Law and Kim 2005; Law and Libecap 2005) . In these instances of relatively more benign regulation, producer interests were usually the most important supporters of reform, but consumers also benefited from regulation. Our account of the history of truth-in-advertising regulation appears to be more consistent with this second set of studies. Although business interests were the key constituencies in favor of truth-inadvertising regulation, it would not appear that consumers were harmed. Indeed, to the extent that these regulations succeeded in improving the credibility of advertising, consumers may have also benefited. Truth-in-advertising regulation therefore furnishes an example of successful Progressive Era regulation in that it was adopted rapidly and may have generated important benefits for both consumers and producers. Manufactures (1899 Manufactures ( , 1909 Manufactures ( , 1914 Manufactures ( , 1919 Manufactures ( , 1923 Manufactures ( and 1929 . Urbanization rates were taken from Census of Population (1899 Population ( , 1909 Population ( , 1919 Population ( , and 1929 State and year fixed effects for 1899, 1909, 1914, 1919, 1923 and 1929 are included in the estimation. Robust-standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. Advertising regulation is a binary variable that equals 1 if a state had enacted a truth-in-advertising law by a certain census year. Strict advertising regulation is a binary variable that equals 1 if a state had enacted a strict version of the truth-in-advertising law. We define a strict law as one that did not require the prosecution to prove intent to mislead. Other covariates in Table 3B include real income per capita, real manufacturing per capita and the level of urbanization. 1909, 1914, 1919, 1923 and 1929 are included in the estimation (1899 Census does not report magazine and newspaper advertising revenues separately). Robust-standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. State and year fixed effects for 1899, 1909, 1914, 1919, 1923 and 1929 are included in the estimation. Robust-standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively.
Notes: Placebo laws are constructed by coding a state as having introduced advertising regulation five years before it actually introduced regulation. "Delayed" laws are constructed by coding a state as having introduced advertising regulation five years after it actually introduced regulation. State and year fixed effects for 1899, 1909, 1914, 1919, 1923 and 1929 are included in the estimation. Robust-standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively.
Appendix Tables   Table A1: Hazard models on the timing of the advertising regulation Robust-standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively.
Notes: Senators who did not vote were excluded from the regression. We used an indicator variable that equals 1 if the state had enacted a truth-in-advertising law before 1914 or per capita advertising expenditures as proxies for advertising interests. First and second dimension D-Nominate scores, which are often used in the voting literature to proxy for a Senator's ideology, a dummy variable indicating if the Senator was a Republican, and the percentage of the state's vote in 1912 that was for the Progressive Party are included as additional explanatory variables.
